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1 Preface 
Digital policy is a unique policy area. As a cross-cutting policy issue, it has an impact not only on individual areas 
of regulation but on almost all other policy areas as well. Aspects of digital policy such as data regimes, cyberse-
curity and standardization issues are relevant not only to the the future of the internet or 5G mobile communications 
infrastructure, but to other areas of our lives to which they are closely linked, which range from automated driving 
to digital assistance systems in education and healthcare to the digitalization of sectors such as agriculture and 
construction. Nevertheless, regulation efforts have thus far been primarily sector-specific and national in their 
scope. With a few exceptions, such as the EU’s controversial General Data Protection Regulation, there are few 
digital policy frameworks in place for Europe that defines and integrates basic principles for broad application. 
Instead, we face a situation in which a variety of approaches stand side by side, at times complementing each other 
but also – all too often – competing with each other in ways that foster inconsistencies. The development of Eu-
rope’s 5G infrastructure is illustrative of this state of affairs. Despite the presence of what were originally uniform 
objectives across Europe, 28 nationally distinct tendering procedures with different requirements have since 
emerged. As a result, we must now find ways to manage the problems associated with having three or more net-
works per country, high costs, a difficult debate over security and the threat of dependency on non-EU providers.  
The coexistence of two worlds of digitalization is also creating new tensions. On the one hand, there is the “original” 
world of digitalization – primarily the internet industry – that is increasingly regulated by digital policy. On the other 
hand, there is the world of those digitalizing areas in traditional industries – such as the automotive industry – where 
the existing regulatory framework is increasingly challenged by digitalization. We nonetheless observe a trend to-
ward the creation of common European rules for digitalization that should help secure Europe’s standing as a stable 
location of values and competitiveness. In order to deliver such results, European digital policy needs not only an 
EU able to take action internationally but one that has the institutional capacity to take action internally. In addition 
to common European rules, this requires improved coordination across the individual sectors, both to strengthen 
the digital single market and to effectively enforce the European legal framework vis á vis third parties in the market. 
These prerequisites must be in place if Europe is to ensure its position as a strong digital location. However, since 
a complete shift of these areas to the European level does not seem realistic in the near future, other approaches 
are required. 
The expertise presented here by Dr. Carolina Ferro and Dr. Ben Wagner on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
draws on a variety of examples to highlight the shortcomings of current practice and outlines possible ways forward 
toward a European, cross-sectoral and yet flexible approach to governance that can address the unforeseeable 
problems of the future. As a proposal for discussion, this publication considers both national concerns and issues 
associated with European coordination. It proposes establishing a variety of discussion forums as well as clearly 
defined decision-making mechanisms for the common interpretation of European law and central support capaci-
ties. These steps seem prudent given the fact that several digital policy issues arise in almost all areas, though not 
at the same time and not permanently or with the same intensity. A European pool of experts complementing the 
resources of European and national actors could prove a valuable source of support in this respect. 
This expert opinion paper was produced within the framework of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 12-month exploratory 
project Shaping Digital Policy – Towards a Fair Digital Society? Underway since the summer of 2019, the project 
has identified significant potential for shaping a participatory digital policy in Europe. As part of the same series, 
two further analyses of European digital strategies (Joschua Helmer 2020) and the changing values in digitalization 
(Dr. Annegret Bendiek and Dr. Jürgen Neyer 2020) are scheduled to be published soon.  
In an effort to facilitate further discussion and debate on the findings of this study, we are publishing this paper 
under a Creative Commons license (CC BY-SA 4.0 DE). We would like to thank Ben Wagner and Carolina Ferro 
for a wholly fruitful collaboration. Together with the authors, we would like to express our appreciation to Daphne 
Keller, Kay Meseberg, Lubos Kuklis, Eliska Pirkova, Paul Jasper Dittrich, Viktoria Grzymek and Louisa Well, whose 
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comments and insights have enriched this publication. Finally, we would be delighted to receive feedback as well 
as any constructive criticism regarding the content featured here. 
       
 
 
 
Falk Steiner      Ralph Müller-Eiselt 
Senior Expert Digital Policy    Director Program Megatrends 
Bertelsmann Stiftung     Bertelsmann Stiftung 
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2 Vorwort 
Die Digitalpolitik ist ein besonderes Politikfeld: als Querschnittsthema betrifft sie nicht bloß einzelne Regulierungs-
bereiche, sondern wirkt sich auf nahezu alle anderen Politikfelder aus. So sind digitalpolitische Aspekte wie Da-
tenregime, Cybersicherheit oder Normierungsfragen nicht nur für die 5G-Mobilfunk-Infrastruktur oder die Zukunft 
des Internets relevant, sondern mit vielen verschiedenen Lebensbereichen engmaschig verknüpft – vom automa-
tisierten Fahren im Straßenverkehr über Assistenzsysteme in Bildung und Gesundheit bis hin zur Digitalisie-
rung von Branchen wie der Land- oder Bauwirtschaft. Dennoch dominiert bislang sektorspezifische und natio-
nale Regulierung. Bis auf wenige Ausnahmen wie die umstrittene Datenschutzgrundverordnung fehlt ein 
digitalpolitischer Rahmen, der übergreifende Grundprinzipien definiert und integriert. Stattdessen steht eine Vielfalt 
unterschiedlicher Ansätze nebeneinander, die sich teils ergänzen, oft genug aber auch miteinander konkurrie-
ren und Inkonsistenz gedeihen lassen. Der Aufbau der 5G-Infrastrktur ist ein gutes Beispiel: Trotz ursprünglich eu-
ropaweit einheitlicher Ziele sind unterdessen 28 nationale Vergabeverfahren mit unterschiedlichen Auflagen ent-
standen. Drei oder mehr Netze pro Land, hohe Kosten, eine schwierige Sicherheitsdebatte und drohende 
Abhängigkeit von Nicht-EU-Anbietern sind die problematischen Folgen.   
Neue Spannungsfelder ergeben sich auch aus dem Nebeneinander zweier  Digitalisierungswelten: zum einen die 
originär digitalen Bereiche vorwiegend der Internetwirtschaft, die durch Digitalpolitik zunehmend reguliert werden, 
zum anderen die sich digitalisierenden Bereiche klassischer Industrien, bei denen wie etwa in der Automobilbran-
che der bestehende regulatorische Rahmen zunehmend von der Digitalisierung herausgefordert wird. Ungeachtet 
dessen ist derzeit ist ein Trend zu gemeinsamen europäischen Regeln für die Digitalisierung zu beobachten, die 
Europa als stabilen Standort von Werten und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit erhalten helfen sollen. Doch dazu braucht eu-
ropäische Digitalpolitik nicht nur eine souverän agierende Union nach außen, sondern auch die nötige institutio-
nelle Handlungsfähigkeit nach innen. Wesentlich hierfür ist neben gemeinsamen europäischen Regeln eine ver-
besserte Koordinierung über die Einzelsektoren hinweg, um sowohl den Digitalen Binnenmarkt zu ertüchtigen als 
auch den europäischen Rechtsrahmens gegenüber dritten Akteuren am Markt wirksam durchzusetzen. Beides ist 
die EU-interne Voraussetzung für einen starken Digitalstandort Europa. Da eine vollständige Verlagerung die-
ser Bereiche auf die europäische Ebene auf absehbare Zeit nicht realistisch erscheint, sind andere Herangehens-
weisen geboten.  
Die hier vorgelegte Expertise von Dr. Carolina Ferro und Dr. Ben Wagner im Auftrag der Bertelsmann Stiftung zeigt 
anhand von unterschiedlichen Beispielen die Defizite der bisherigen Praxis auf und skizziert Lösungsansätze für 
einen europäischen, sektorenübergreifenden und trotzdem flexiblen Governance-Ansatz, der auch für heute noch 
nicht absehbare Problemstellungen trägt. Dieser Diskussionsvorschlag denkt sowohl nationale Belange als auch 
europäische Koordination mit. Er beinhaltet nicht nur Gesprächsforen, sondern auch klar definierte Entscheidungs-
mechanismen zur gemeinsamen Auslegung europäischen Rechts und zentrale Unterstützungskapazitäten. Denn 
viele digitalpolitische Fragestellungen stellen sich zwar in fast allen Bereichen, aber nicht immer zur gleichen Zeit 
und nicht immer dauerhaft in gleicher Intensität. Hier könnte ein die Ressourcen europäischer und nationaler Ak-
teure ergänzender europäischer Expertenpool eine wertvolle Hilfe sein.  
Diese Expertise ist als Teil der einjährigen Exploration Digitalpolitik Gestalten – Towards a Fair Digital 
Society? entstanden, in der die Bertelsmann Stiftung seit Sommer 2019 wesentliche Gestaltungspotenziale für 
eine teilhabeförderliche Digitalpolitik in Europa identifiziert hat. In der gleichen Reihe erscheinen kurzfristig 
zwei weitere Analysen über Europäische Digitalstrategien (Joschua Helmer 2020) und den Wertewandel in der Di-
gitalisierung (Dr. Annegret Bendiek und Dr. Jürgen Neyer 2020).   
Um den Diskurs und die Debatte über die Ergebnisse dieser Studie zu erleichtern, veröffentlichen wir sie unter einer 
freien Lizenz (CC BY-SA 4.0 DE). Wir bedanken uns bei Ben Wagner und Carolina Ferro für die produktive Zusa-
menarbeit und mit den beiden Autoren zusammen bei Daphne Keller, Kay Meseberg, Lubos Kuklis, Eliska Pir-
kova, Paul Jasper Dittrich, Viktoria Grzymek und Louisa Well, von deren Anregungen und Impulsen die Publikation 
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sehr profitiert hat. Über Resonanz und natürlich auch weitere konstruktive Kritik an dieser Publikation würden wir 
uns sehr freuen.  
 
 
 
 
Falk Steiner      Ralph Müller-Eiselt 
Senior Expert Digitalpolitik    Director Programm Megatrends 
Bertelsmann Stiftung     Bertelsmann Stiftung 
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3 Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Bericht gibt einen Überblick über die Bemühungen zur Governance von Digitalisierungsprozessen in 
Europa. Er versucht zu erläutern, wie solche Governance-Mechanismen derzeit funktionieren, und gibt 
Anregungen, wie solche Bemühungen in Zukunft effektiver funktionieren könnten. Er behandelt dabei vier 
Fallstudien, die die Herausforderungen und Mängel der Governance-Bemühungen zur Gestaltung von 
Digitalisierungsprozessen veranschaulichen. Die diskutierten EU-Beispielen sind das deutsche 
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (NetzDG), der Automobil-(Software-)Emissionsskandal, das globale 
Multistakeholder-Internet-Governance-Modell und der erwartete Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zur 
Plattformregulierung. 
Die Analyse dieser Fälle zeigt, dass Governance-Bemühungen, die auf digitale Prozesse ausgerichtet sind, in 
Europa zu scheitern scheinen. Bestehende Governance-Modelle stehen vor erheblichen Herausforderungen im 
Hinblick auf Effektivität, Transparenz, Rechenschaftspflicht und damit der Good Governance. Akteuren des 
öffentlichen Sektors auf subnationaler, nationaler, internationaler und supranationaler Ebene fehlt es häufig an der 
Fähigkeit oder der Bereitschaft, bestehende Gesetze umzusetzen und somit sicherzustellen, dass die 
Regulierungen effektiv durchgeführt werden. Es besteht ein offensichtliches Defizit im Hinblick auf das Verständnis 
der Funktionsweise von Technologie, ein ständiges Unterschätzen des Umfangs und des Ausmaßes des Problems 
und das scheinbar routinemäßige Bemühen, wichtige Fragen der Governance zu umschiffen, anstatt sie zu lösen. 
Dabei scheinen die Hindernisse keineswegs unlösbar. 
Wenn aus diesem Bericht eine Reihe wichtiger Lehren gezogen werden können, bleibt die wohl wichtigste, dass 
die Staaten diese Herausforderung dringend annehmen müssen, wenn sie eine sinnvolle Rolle bei der Governance 
der digitalen Technologien spielen wollen. Die EU muss die Aufsicht über den Digitalisierungsprozess in eigene 
Hände nehmen. Gegenwärtig wird die überwiegende Mehrheit der Governancemaßnahmen, die auf digitale 
Umgebungen ausgerichtet sind, vom privaten Sektor durchgeführt, mit wenig staatlicher Intervention oder Aufsicht. 
Gleichzeitig legt dieser Bericht nahe, dass Nationalstaaten diese Regulierungsdynamik selbst gestalten können – 
jedoch nur dann, wenn sie die notwendigen Schritte unternehmen, um eine dezentrale und effektive 
Implementierungsstruktur zu organisieren. 
Zu den Empfehlungen, die von den Autoren des Berichts diskutiert werden, gehören 
1) Die Schaffung neuer, unabhängiger Behörden auf EU-Ebene, die die Aufgabe haben, die Vielfalt der 
von der Digitalisierung stark betroffenen Bereiche zu überwachen, wie z.B. die Online-Redaktion oder die 
Durchführung freier und fairer Wahlen. Dies würde die Schaffung sektoraler Regulierungsbehörden für 
digitale Dienste nach sich ziehen. Um wirksam zu sein, müssten solche Regulierungsbehörden 
ausreichend öffentlich finanziert werden und völlig unabhängig handeln können. Solche Aufsichtsbehörden 
müssten in der Lage sein, eine rasche und wirksame unparteiische öffentliche Entscheidungsfindung 
innerhalb ihres jeweiligen Regulierungsrahmens zu gewährleisten. Ebenso müssten sie mit den 
personellen und finanziellen Ressourcen und der Technologie ausgestattet sein, die zur Erfüllung ihrer 
Aufgaben erforderlich sind. Nur dann hätten die Regulierungsbehörden die Durchsetzungskapazität, die 
erforderlich ist, um eine effektive Governance der Digitalisierung effektiv zu gewährleisten. 
 
2) Die Rechtsetzung auf EU-Ebene analog zur Datenschutzgrundverordnung (DSGVO), zusammen mit 
einer entsprechenden Struktur für Regulierung, in einer umfassenden Reihe von Bereichen, die von 
der Digitalisierung tiefgreifend beeinflusst werden. In jedem Bereich gäbe es idealerweise nationale 
Regulierer für jeden Mitgliedsstaat, einen europäischen Regulierer und ein Gremium auf europäischer 
Ebene, das alle relevanten Akteure in diesem Bereich zusammenbringt. Dies würde die Entwicklung 
unabhängiger Netzwerke der Regulierungsbehörden nach sich ziehen. 
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Die Implementierung eines vernetzten und dezentralisierten Digitalisierungs-Governance-Modells für die 
Regulierung digitaler Dienste im Binnenmarkt und insbesondere von Online-Plattformen. Im Gegensatz zu 
mindestens einer Option, die im Entwurf des Digital Services Act (DSA) der EU-Kommission enthalten ist, der die 
Schaffung einer neuen zentralen Behörde und eines zentralisierten Governance-Modells vorschlägt, schlägt dieser 
Bericht alternativ die Schaffung einer Digital Services Act Regulator (DSAR) vor. Der DSAR wäre keine zentrale 
Regulierungsbehörde für digitale Plattformen und Online-Dienste, sondern würde stattdessen als zentrale 
Einberufungsstruktur fungieren, die für die Koordinierung einer Reihe unabhängiger Regulierungsbehörden 
verantwortlich wäre. Dieses Gremium würde sich nicht auf einen bestimmten sektoralen Bereich konzentrieren, 
sondern würde die Befugnis erhalten, je nach zu erörterndem Thema verschiedene sektorale 
Regulierungsbehörden zusammenzubringen. Somit würde es Diskussionen zwischen unabhängigen 
Regulierungsnetzwerken mit dem Ziel koordinieren, die Zusammenarbeit und gemeinsame Entscheidungsfindung 
zu verschiedenen Themen innerhalb des geltenden Rechtsrahmens zu fördern. In einigen Fällen könnte der DSAR 
auch Probleme feststellen, die ein Tätigwerden der Gesetzgeber erfordern könnten. Er würde Probleme wie Online-
Hassreden in sozialen Netzwerken, Transparenz in der politischen Online-Werbung, Desinformationskampagnen, 
Fairness im elektronischen Handel, Moderation von Inhalten, Transparenz in der Werbung und die Besteuerung 
von digitalen Gütern und Dienstleistungen behandeln.
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4 Executive summary 
This report provides an overview of efforts to govern digitalization processes in Europe. It seeks to understand how 
such governance mechanisms currently operate and provides suggestions as to how such efforts might work more 
effectively in future. It focuses on a set of four case studies that illustrate the challenges and flaws of governance 
efforts intended to shape digitalization processes. The EU examples discussed include the German Network En-
forcement Act (NetzDG), the automobile (software) emissions scandal, the global multistakeholder internet govern-
ance model, and the EU Commission’s pending platform-regulation proposal. 
The analysis of these cases shows that governance efforts directed toward digital processes seem to be failing in 
Europe. Existing governance models are experiencing significant challenges with regard to effectiveness, trans-
parency, accountability and good governance. Public-sector actors at sub-national, national, international and su-
pranational levels demonstrate a frequent lack of capability or willingness to implement existing laws and ensure 
that regulations are carried out effectively. There is an evident deficiency with regard to understanding how tech-
nology works, a continual underestimation of the problem’s scope and scale, and what appears to be a routine 
effort to evade rather than solve key governance issues. Therefore, the hindrances appear primarily institutional. 
They are by no means impossible to solve. 
While a variety of important lessons can be learned from this report, the most important one is that states urgently 
need to accept this challenge if they want to play any meaningful role in the governance of digital technologies. The 
EU must take oversight of the digitalization process into its own hands. Currently, the vast majority of governance 
activities directed toward digital environments are conducted by the private sector, with little state intervention or 
oversight. At the same time, this report suggests that nation-states can themselves shape these regulatory dynam-
ics, but only if they take the necessary steps to organize a distributed and effective implementation structure. 
Recommendations discussed by the authors in the report include: 
1) The creation of new, independent public authorities at the EU level tasked with overseeing the 
variety of areas highly impacted by digitalization, such as online speech or the conduct of free and fair 
elections. This would entail the creation of sectoral digital-services regulators. To be effective, such 
regulators would have to be adequately publicly funded and be able to act with complete independence. 
Such supervisory authorities would have to be able to ensure swift and effective impartial public deci-
sion-making within their relevant regulatory frameworks. They would similarly have to be furnished with 
the human and financial resources and the technology necessary to perform their duties. Only then 
would the regulators have the enforcement capability required to govern digitalization effectively. 
 
2) The implementation at the EU level of legislation analogous to the General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR), along with a corresponding regulatory structure, across a comprehensive set of fields 
that are profoundly impacted by digitalization. In each area, there would ideally be national regulators 
for each member state, a European regulator and a European-level board that brings together all rele-
vant actors within that area. This would entail the development of independent regulatory networks. 
 
3) The implementation of a networked and decentralized digitalization governance model for the 
regulation of digital services in the Single Market, and of online platforms in particular. In contrast to 
at least one option contained within the EU Commission’s draft Digital Services Act (DSA) proposal, 
which suggests the creation of a new central authority and a centralized governance model, this report 
alternatively proposes the creation of a Digital Services Act Regulator (DSAR). The DSAR would not 
be a central regulator for digital platforms and online services, but would instead act as a central con-
vening structure, responsible for coordinating a set of independent regulatory authorities. This body 
would not be focused on any specific sectoral area but would have the power to bring together different 
sectoral regulators depending on the topic to be discussed. Hence, it would coordinate discussions 
Page 12 | Executive summary 
 
between independent regulatory networks with the aim of promoting collaboration and joint decision-
making on various topics, within the applicable legal framework. In some cases, it might also identify 
issues requiring action by legislators. It would address problems such as online hate speech in social 
networks, transparency in online political advertising, disinformation campaigns, fairness in e-com-
merce, content moderation, advertising transparency, and the taxation of digital goods and services. 
Effective governance requires institutions with the ability to regulate. The kind of oversight, implementation and 
enforcement needed to govern digitalization will be possible only if the EU is willing to promote GDPR-style legis-
lation and regulatory structures with strong institutions across a broad set of relevant digital fields. This involves 
accepting that the challenge of governing digitalization calls for effective oversight requiring a robust institutional 
response. States certainly have the ability and resources to give such an answer. It remains to be seen whether 
they will actually be committed to do so. 
Introduction | Page 13 
 
 
5 Introduction 
States around the world are trying to develop effective governance mechanisms for the ongoing process of 
digitalization. As some have described it, “software is eating the world” (Andreessen 2011), making this question 
more important by the day; nevertheless, it is today almost impossible to reconcile public discourses about digital 
technologies with the actual reality of these technologies. A body convened by the United Nations Secretary-
General has debated new forms of governance in the digital age for more than a decade (Ermert 2019), and efforts 
to govern digitalization processes have often proved to be difficult, messy and complicated.  
Before we go deeper into this debate, it is necessary to conceptualize the notions of digitalization and governance 
more precisely. Digitalization can be defined as a progressive use of digital technologies and digitalized data that 
changes how things are done, transforms the way in which citizens, government, civil society and companies 
engage and interact with one another, and restructures many domains of social life.1 In the case of governance, 
we draw on the concept of “internet governance” as formulated by the Working Group on Internet Governance; 
here, this concept is defined as “the development and application by governments, the private sector and civil 
society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures and programs that 
shape the evolution and use of the internet” (WGIG 2005) and of digitalization processes in general. While this 
definition is explicitly related to the internet, it can easily be applied more generally to digital technologies in general. 
This conceptualization provides us with a broad comprehension of governance mechanisms directed at 
digitalization processes, in which the institutions, actors and processes of governance can vary greatly while 
nevertheless suggesting the collective, policy-motivated shaping of a socio-technical system (van Eeten and 
Mueller 2012). 
The abundance of public declarations of digital rights – which with the single exception of Brazil’s Marco Civil da 
Internet lack binding legal status – coupled with the myriad of European digital strategies that have not been 
systematically implemented (Volland 2019), tends to indicate a considerable implementation problem with regard 
to carrying out a targeted approach to digitalization. To date, it appears that the governance mechanisms proposed 
have been unable to achieve their desired policy outcomes. In some cases, the forms of digitalization governance 
discussed may even have been counterproductive.  
In the following sections, this report will offer an overview of several digital governance mechanisms within and 
outside Europe. Grounded in the existing academic literature on technology governance (Brown and Marsden 2013; 
Crawford and Lumby 2013; Fountain 2007; Wagner 2016) as well as in wider theories of governance (Ackerman 
2004; Barnett and Duvall 2005), the report seeks to improve our understanding of how the governance of 
digitalization processes currently functions, and how it might function in future. To achieve this goal, we will focus 
on a set of four examples chosen to illustrate the challenges of implementation and compliance in the digital age: 
1) The German Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) 
2) The automobile (software) emissions scandal  
3) The multistakeholder governance model and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 
4) The pending European platform-regulation proposal and the Digital Services Act (DSA) 
 
 
1  By contrast, “digitization” is the process of converting information from analogue to digital format. For more information 
related to the concept of digitalization and digitization, please see: https://medium.com/@colleenchapco/digitization-
digitalization-and-digital-transformation-whats-the-difference-eff1d002fbdf. Accessed on 4 November 2019. 
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These examples will be used to provide an overview of the manner in which EU governments have sought to govern 
digitalization. We will use them to develop an analytical framework based on the following nine dimensions or core 
items of inquiry: 
1) What actors are involved in shaping these processes? 
2) What actors are not involved in shaping these processes, but should be? 
3) How do these actors shape the process of digitalization? What mechanisms do they employ to ensure 
their voice is heard? 
4) What role do sub-national, national, international and supranational public-sector actors play in 
governing digitalization?  
5) Which actors are best positioned to respond to these governance challenges?  
6) Are processes of self-regulation, co-regulation or full (state) regulation in play, and if so, how effective 
are these processes? 
7) What is the role of the law in these processes? When is a focus on purely legal means helpful, and 
when are other means necessary? 
8) What are the challenges for democratic governance raised by these implementation problems? 
9) What are the strongest indicators of success or failure? How can this be measured effectively? 
 
As this report will discuss, existing models of governance have experienced significant challenges with regard to 
effectiveness, transparency, accountability and good governance. This in turn has meant that as more and more of 
the world transitions to using digital technologies, the overall quality of governance is decreasing. 
The broader question asked by the proposed framework is: What would “better” governance of digitalization 
look like? While it might be seen as an ambitious goal, this report will shed light on how better governance mech-
anisms might function. To do so, we will draw on the example of the EU Commission’s pending Digital Services 
Act (DSA) proposal, which raises the possibility of creating a new authority for the regulation of all digital services 
in the Single Market, and of online platforms in particular. This point of departure was chosen for two main reasons. 
First, the DSA discussions are still underway; this allows us to conceptualize an effective outcome before it reaches 
the implementation stage, and maybe even influence the ongoing debate. Second, rather than being focused on a 
specific area of the digital world (e.g., hate speech), this debate concerns state regulation of digitalization processes 
generally. Based on the DSA example, we will propose a digitalization governance model intended not to fix all 
flaws associated with the governance of digitization processes, but rather to serve as a contribution with regard to 
enriching the discussion on digital governance within the EU, and as a starting point in the visualization of better 
governance mechanisms. 
It is no longer enough to argue about what the appropriate metaphor for a given digital domain might be, or whether 
an email should be considered a postcard, a letter or a telegram for regulatory purposes. The debate instead needs 
to shift toward an effort to understand how digitalization can be effectively governed to the benefit of societies as a 
whole. Unless better, more effective forms of governance are found, even well-intentioned political initiatives will 
fail. The digital world needs an effective leviathan that is able to govern democratically, not a headless chicken. 
This report begins, in Section 1, by discussing four European cases related to the governance of digitalization 
processes (or the lack of it). This section is intended to illustrate the challenges of implementation, while providing 
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a current overview of selected digitalization governance efforts in Europe. In Section 2, these examples are dis-
cussed in a more cross-cutting manner. We ponder why many EU digital governance initiatives are failing, try to 
identify what these cases have in common, and seek to draw lessons from their flaws and successes. In Section 
3, building on the EU Commission’s pending DSA, we propose our own digitalization governance model, seeking 
to understand what elements might improve the efficacy of existing models. By way of conclusion, the report’s 
Section 4 issues an urgent call for states to create strong institutions with the ability to enforce digital-sector regu-
lations if they want to play any meaningful role in governing digital technologies. Finally, the report suggests that it 
is perfectly possible for states to shape regulatory dynamics effectively if they take this issue seriously, willing to 
organize a distributed implementation structure.
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6 Governance of digitalization: Failing forward? Four case studies  
The following chapter presents four case studies from Europe that address attempts by public-sector actors and 
institutions to govern digitalization processes. These examples allow us to take a close look at the key challenges 
faced by states in regulating digitalization processes in different areas and at different levels. These case studies 
reveal an implementation gap that is in turn related to an institutional gap, indicating that as long as there are no 
institutions able to regulate effectively, governments are unlikely to play a meaningful role in the digitalization gov-
ernance process. 
6.1 The German Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) 
The German Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, NetzDG) is one of the most far-reaching 
efforts by a Western democracy to hold social-media platforms responsible for combatting hate speech and the 
incitation of violence (Tworek and Leerssen 2019). Along with the new EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(AVMSD), it attempts to set standards for the regulation of online platforms. 
Germany passed the NetzDG law in June 2017, with the first parts of the law coming into force on 1 October 2017. 
Social networks were given until the end of that year to prepare themselves for compliance. Hence, the law came 
into full force in January 2018. The law does not provide for any substantive changes with regard to the type of 
content being regulated. That is, most of what the NetzDG law does is refer to existing German legal norms on 
illegal content, although it does notably exclude some forms of illegal content such as copyright violations from the 
scope of the law.  
At a procedural level, the NetzDG is much more ambitious. Its main objective is to reduce illegal content online by 
ensuring that platforms implement more effective ways of reporting and deleting potentially unlawful content, while 
also increasing the transparency and accountability associated with removal of content from the platforms (Wagner 
et al. 2020). Under the law, online platforms have to provide a mechanism for users to submit complaints about 
illegal content. Once they receive a complaint, platforms must investigate whether the content is illegal. They have 
a 24-hour deadline for the removal of “manifestly unlawful” content after receiving the complaint (otherwise disal-
lowed content must be removed within seven days of the notification)2; failing this, they face fines of up to €50 
million for the systemic failure to delete illegal content. It is as yet unclear precisely what systemic failure looks like. 
However, the German Federal Office of Justice has brought several cases that will probably lead to clarification in 
the courts. 
NetzDG applies to for-profit media service providers with at least two million registered users that operate 
online platforms with user-generated content. Platforms that provide journalistic or editorial content do not 
fall under the scope of NetzDG, nor do instant messaging services like WhatsApp, Wire or Telegram (Wag-
ner et al. 2020). 
In point of fact, NetzDG has become a very controversial law. On the one hand, supporters see the legislation as 
a necessary response to the threat of online hatred and extremism. It is important to remember the context in which 
it was originally discussed, during Germany’s 2017 election season; at this time, the fear that the right-wing Alter-
native for Germany (AfD) political party would win national parliamentary seats for the first time pushed legislators 
to act to prevent the propagation of hate speech on social media (Echikson and Knodt 2018; Wagner 2018). On 
the other hand, German and international critics view the law as creating legal mechanisms that are likely to un-
dermine the freedom of expression online (Echikson and Knodt 2018; Kaesling 2018; Rebecca Zipursky 2019; 
Schulz 2018; Tworek and Leerssen 2019), thus promoting censorship, and as lacking transparency provisions 
 
2 An English version of the law is available at: https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=1245. Accessed on 4 November 
2019. 
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around content-reporting mechanisms (Tworek and Leerssen 2019; Wagner et al. 2020). The law has even recently 
been the subject of parliamentary hearings in which potential revisions were discussed (Kettemann 2019). 
In the context of this heavy criticism and the wider push for platform regulation in Europe,3 it is particularly important 
to evaluate the law’s effectiveness and regulatory impact.  
Most recently, the NetzDG has also been suggested as a mechanism for the reduction of the online hate speech 
deemed to be a key enabler of terrorist right-wing attacks such as the attacks on a Jewish synagogue in Halle on 
9 October 2019. In response to these attacks, the German Interior Ministry has suggested that mechanisms could 
be introduced into NetzDG to promote the takedown of hate-driven content.4 
But how does the NetzDG attempt to provide governance in the area of hate speech? Germany’s Federal Office of 
Justice (Bundesamt für Justiz, BfJ), which reports directly to the Minister of Justice, plays a crucial role in the 
enforcement of the NetzDG. People can report violations of the law to the BfJ, which has made an online form 
available for the purpose, and companies must submit transparency reports to the BfJ. Section 2 of the NetzDG 
specifies that platforms that receive more than 100 notifications about unlawful content per year must publish a 
public transparency report in German every six months. These reports provide insight into the relevant statistics 
and information. Therefore, the BfJ is the main regulator with regard to enforcing the NetzDG.  
Despite these changes, the NetzDG does little to change the existing dynamics of content regulation by online 
platforms. Thus, the previously existing self-regulatory regime for social-media platforms has been continued (Wag-
ner 2018). Higher minimum standards for self-regulation by social-media platforms would go a long way toward 
responding to the many challenging questions about content regulation. Even with regard to illegal content under 
the NetzDG regime, the internet platforms are assigned the role of deleting content and blocking users, leaving the 
task of arbitrating such questions to them. While the fines provided for by the NetzDG increase pressure on social-
media platforms to be more accountable, they essentially force the unaccountable private platforms to decide what 
is (and is not) illegal content. The short time frame in which the law expects companies to remove “manifestly 
illegal” content could easily lead them to err on the side of automated censorship in an effort to avoid steep fines 
and be more economically efficient (Wagner 2018). 
This thus presents a kind of regulatory paradox. As legislators focus on regulating internet platforms, they find 
themselves in a downward spiral in which law-enforcement duties are legally transferred to private-sector entities, 
effectively amounting to a new kind of deregulation. “Perhaps vexed by the unique characteristics of social-media 
companies, legislators are dumping decision-making power and responsibility on the companies in a manner that 
is neither helpful nor effective in resolving the problem” (Wagner 2018). As such, they are privatizing decisions that 
should be made by independent authorities (Kaesling 2018). “More broadly, the question remains how and whether 
outside stakeholders can and should be involved in platform content moderation processes or their regulation” 
(Tworek and Leerssen 2019). 
As we can see, there are many governance challenges regarding the implementation of the NetzDG. But what 
specific actors are involved, and what might “better” governance of these digitalization processes look like? 
The primary actor involved in shaping NetzDG-related regulation processes is Germany’s Federal Office of Justice 
(BfJ), a state actor. A key factor in understanding this case is the fact that BfJ is not an independent regulator. 
Rather, it is a subordinate public authority (nachrangige Behörde) of the Ministry of Justice. In the following discus-
sion, we will address the challenges and risks associated with this regulatory design. In part, this model means the 
 
3 Two representative EU examples would be the UK Government’s “Online Harms White Paper” (UK Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media & Sport 2019) and the French proposal on making social-media platforms more accountable (French Govern-
ment 2019). 
4 Details of the proposal can be found here: https://netzpolitik.org/2019/nach-halle-innenminister-praesentieren-wunschkata-
log-fuer-neue-ueberwachungsmassnahmen/. Accessed on 24 October 2019. 
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Ministry of Justice itself and its minister are important actors to be considered. Finally, the large private social-
media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, which the law is struggling to regulate, play a central role. 
Some actors that are not helping to shape the NetzDG process (though they most likely should be) are nonetheless 
important enough to require acknowledgement. Among them are comparatively small platforms such as Joyclub or 
change.org, which fall under the NetzDG’s regulatory purview, but whose role was barely considered during the 
public debates about NetzDG. Civil society participation as a whole is lacking in the regulation process. The NetzDG 
law itself was drawn up in 2017 with little to no input from civil society organizations (Tworek and Leerssen 2019). 
Consideration of the input provided by German and international scholars on this topic would also be of great 
assistance in improving the governance of the NetzDG implementation process. This is particularly vital given that 
the law is based on user notifications, and there is no independent assessment of whether these notifications 
correspond to actual breaches of the law. As this process is driven by user flagging, it seems quite likely that certain 
types of content and certain types of users will be disproportionately affected. Indeed, the actual implementation of 
content-flagging systems can have considerable discriminatory consequences, similar to those already evident in 
the area of crowdsourced rating systems (Kocher and Hensel 2016). 
Passage and implementation of the German law has been driven by national German electoral politics and a widely 
perceived need to respond to online hate speech (Wagner 2018). However, a variety of definitional and statistical 
problems in the law make it unclear whether the NetzDG will in fact be able to stop problematic speech. Most 
importantly, the measure covers only illegal content, and not legal content. Facebook is an emblematic case in this 
regard, since the BfJ fined the company in July 2019 (€2 million) for systematically failing to comply with the 
NetzDG’s transparency requirements, and for the use of so-called dark patterns, or design techniques used to 
manipulate users. Facebook has appealed the ruling (Orth 2019). To better understand this BfJ decision, it is nec-
essary to explain that Facebook’s approach to NetzDG is different from that of most other platforms.  
For most companies, user complaints can be made with reference either to the given social-media platform’s com-
munity standards or to the NetzDG. However, Facebook has developed a completely separate reporting procedure 
for complaints made under the NetzDG (Echikson and Knodt 2018). The processes for reporting complaints under 
the NetzDG are very difficult to find on Facebook (even to the point of being hidden, you could say). For example, 
the reporting procedure is not launched at the point where the user is viewing the objectionable content (as in the 
case of Community Standards reports), but is instead initiated far away from the content itself, in the Facebook 
Help Center. This makes the process difficult to find, requiring users to expend extra effort. Facebook also attempts 
to redirect users to report the content as a Community Standards violation instead of under the terms of the NetzDG5  
(Wagner et al. 2020). This mechanism, entailing an interface design aimed to divert, obstruct and redirect, can be 
considered a “dark pattern” that enhances information asymmetries and thereby limits users’ abilities to access 
their rights (Wagner et al. 2020).  
Another problematic angle of this story is Facebook’s two-step approach to the reported content (Echikson and 
Knodt 2018; Wagner et al. 2020). The content is first reviewed with reference to the company’s Community Stand-
ards. If these are violated, then the piece of content is removed globally. If the content in question violates German 
law but not Facebook’s Community Standards, then the content is blocked only in Germany. Thus, analysis of the 
content under the company’s own Community Standards takes precedence over ensuring that it complies with 
German law. This approach “has allowed Facebook to avoid having its broader content review process subject to 
NetzDG transparency reports” (Wagner et al. 2020). 
In this context, the BfJ found that Facebook has underreported the number of complaints it had received about 
illegal content on its platform. In addition, the Justice Minister remarked that it is “exceedingly difficult for a user to 
complain to Facebook about posts that violate NetzDG” (Deutsche Welle 2019). To be fair to Facebook, the law’s 
transparency requirements lack clarity. For instance, the lack of reporting requirements for the moderation of 
 
5 See: https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/2062389003993934. Accessed on October 21, 2019. 
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content deemed legal opens the door to precisely the kind of category shifting between NetzDG and Community 
Standards that Facebook has engaged in. “What we now have in Germany is a law that demands respect and 
disproportionate attention from Facebook without actually forcing the company to reform its practices in the public 
interest” (Wagner 2018). 
The current case is of far-reaching importance because the principles of “good regulation” (OECD 2005, 2011) 
regarding global platforms are being tested. On the one hand, the BfJ and the Ministry of Justice have taken an 
antagonistic approach to the regulation of these platforms. State regulators provide little or no help with regard to 
implementing the NetzDG, and the overall goal pursued by them seems to be to promote the primacy of German 
law over platforms’ community standards. On the other hand, platforms such as Facebook seem to be implementing 
the law poorly, which at least in Facebook’s case has led the BfJ to levy a €2 million fine (Orth 2019). Transparency 
requirements are being systematically ignored or misinterpreted because no one is entirely clear what they mean, 
and because it is convenient for the platforms (Wagner et al. 2020). 
For transparency mechanisms to be effective, BfJ regulators must work in a collaborative manner and assist with 
the implementation of such practices, for instance by creating guidelines and a standard for transparency reports 
that enables statistics to be compared across platforms (currently, social-network platforms have each come up 
with their own individual reporting formulas; however, comparability across platforms is critical in order to gauge 
the effectiveness of NetzDG implementation). Furthermore, regulators should direct the platforms in their operations 
in a consultative manner; incentivize design practices that improve transparency, even to the point of offering grants 
to smaller companies to develop well-designed and easy-to-use user interfaces; and create a quality standard for 
complaint mechanisms enabling tech companies to be certified for user-friendly reporting processes. Such initia-
tives and others like them would support broader accountability regimes and promote access to human rights online 
(Echikson and Knodt 2018; Wagner et al. 2020).  
Public-sector governance seems to be failing in the NetzDG case. Rather than deputizing social-media platforms 
to act as a privatized police force (by engaging in self-regulating content moderation), the law could instead shift 
the decision-making burden to public actors. At first glance, basing public-sector governance in a public-sector 
agency like the BfJ seems like a good idea with regard to regulating online platforms. However, the agency needs 
to be independent in order to ensure swift, effective and impartial public decision-making. “This is one important 
design flaw in NetzDG, as enforcement was not given to an independent regulator” (Wagner et al. 2020). The 
agency is currently subject to partisan political forces that affect its ability to make impartial decisions. 
There is some danger in creating a central platform regulator. A better solution would be to create a wider range of 
individual regulators focusing on specific issues. Historically, problems related to digitalization have been dumped 
on data-protection authorities (DPAs), where they don’t belong, often because of the lack of preexisting public 
institutional structures able and willing to enforce regulations. The NetzDG is thus subject to an “implementation 
gap,” which is in turn related to an “institutional gap” in which “accountable public actors who should be ensuring 
the implementation of law in the digital sphere are lacking” (Wagner 2019).  
Moreover, there are other areas in which the public sector could play a meaningful role in mitigating hate speech 
on social media. For instance, the Netherlands created a special centralized unit tasked with processing all 
takedown orders and requests for data from online service providers in an effort to ensure that they are legally 
sound (Wagner 2018). Other initiatives such as appeals bodies for takedown decisions and rapid-response judicial 
mechanisms to adjudicate complaints (Tworek and Leerssen 2019) would be beneficial in the interest of better 
regulation. However, even in these comparatively advanced approaches, there are challenges of transparency and 
accountability (Kaye 2019). 
The NetzDG provides an interesting case study of state regulation, since self-regulation by private-sector organi-
zations is unlikely to be successful in the absence of meaningful incentives underpinning such procedures (Access 
Now 2018). The approach in the German case is primarily legal and regulatory. If designed well, it could be highly 
effective. However, the challenges for democratic governance remain serious. The law could set in motion a 
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process initiating an open public debate incorporating all relevant stakeholders. Civil society needs to play a greater 
role in this process of regulation. For example, the creation of social-media councils that regularly convened repre-
sentatives from the platforms, governments and civil society organizations to share information and debate possible 
new approaches would be highly beneficial (Tworek and Leerssen 2019). One major goal would be to determine 
minimum standards of self-regulation that conform with human rights and international standards for online plat-
forms. 
The design of the reporting mechanisms currently employed by the NetzDG do not lend themselves adequately to 
measuring the success or failure of the law’s implementation. At minimum, they would also need to include all 
information related to the moderation of content deemed legal (as opposed to illegal) in Germany; a requirement 
that platforms standardize their categorization of content, thus enabling comparison; ideally, a provision requiring 
more frequent reports (monthly basis); regular third-party audits of representative samples of both legal/illegal and 
moderated/unmoderated content to establish whether the platform’s definitions of legal and illegal content were 
deemed accurate; systematic third-party audits of all NetzDG-related procedures, similar to those currently con-
ducted by DPAs on issues of data protection; and an independent BfJ – or alternatively a transfer of the BfJ’s 
NetzDG-related tasks to a more independent public authority – that would be able to conduct such audits, with 
sufficient staffing to be able to do so. Finally, it would be crucial to create a comparative and open database enabling 
systematic comparison between platforms. 
6.2 The automobile (software) emissions scandal 
One could ask: Why should the “Dieselgate” scandal be considered as a digital governance issue in the first place? 
The digital dimension of Dieselgate lies in the fact that regulators and enforcement authorities underestimated the 
power of software, and as we will point out in the following discussion, were unable to check this particular part of 
the system in question. These are challenges of digital governance just as much as platform politics, but are seldom 
discussed in the same context. The challenges of digital governance cut across all areas of regulation, and are not 
just limited to areas such as data protection or privacy. 
In 2013, the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) in the United States initiated an examination of 
pollution from diesel cars. They had no idea it would lead to one of the biggest global automotive scandals to date, 
the Dieselgate scandal, as it became known. The Volkswagen emissions scandal began in September 2015, when 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation of the U.S. Clean Air Act to 
the German automaker (Gardiner 2019). Volkswagen admitted that emissions software in four-cylinder diesel 
vehicles from model years 2009 – 2015 contained a “defeat device,” effectively a deliberate effort to evade the rules 
in the form of hidden software that could recognize whether a vehicle was being operated in a test laboratory or on 
the road (Chappell 2015). The defeat device had been installed in 11 million diesel-fueled vehicles worldwide.6 The 
software made those vehicles emit higher nitrogen-oxide levels when they were being driven in actual road use (as 
high as 40 times the legal limit) than during laboratory testing. Michael Horn, then the CEO of Volkswagen's U.S. 
business, confessed that the software had the express purpose of beating emissions tests, although he said he 
was not aware of this fact until the scandal came to light. “It was installed for this purpose,” he said (Chappell 2015). 
As it turned out, Volkswagen wasn’t the only one evading these laws; indeed, Fiat, Renault, Mercedes, Opel and 
Ford, among others, had also pursued analogous policies. Less flagrantly, but to similar effect, the vast majority of 
diesel cars were making a mockery of emissions rules in the United States, Europe and worldwide. “In the U.S., 
where only around 2% of cars are diesel, the rule-breaking had an impact. But the health consequences have been 
far more severe in Europe, where drivers had been encouraged for years to buy diesel cars – when the scandal 
 
6 See Volkswagen’s statement of 22 September 2015 at: http://www.volkswagenag.com/en/news/2015/9/Ad_hoc_US.html. 
Accessed on 22 October 2019. 
Governance of digitalization: Failing forward? Four case studies | Page 21 
 
 
broke, they accounted for more than half of all sales” (Gardiner 2019). A study revealed that Dieselgate helped 
cause 6,800 premature deaths in the EU in 2015 (Anenberg et al. 2017). 
The disturbing light cast by the scandal did more than simply expose corporate transgressions. It also made visible 
the stunning failure by governments across Europe to enforce the law effectively. The negligence of so many 
governments with regard to enforcing the law represents the missing piece of this puzzle. “Member States 
contravened their legal obligation to monitor and enforce the ban on defeat devices set out in Article 5(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No. 715/2007. None of them found the defeat devices installed in the Volkswagen vehicles, in 
particular those Member States whose authorities type-approved those vehicles” (Gieseke and Gerbrandy 2017).  
It even seems that some actors knew about the problem all along, as an official at Germany’s federal environment 
agency noted: “We publish this data. […] In principle, this is nothing new” (Gardiner 2019). Even the EU 
Commission was aware of it. “Some years before the Dieselgate scandal erupted, the European Commission's 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) signaled in 2011 that there was a significant discrepancy between car NOx [nitrogen 
oxide] emissions under laboratory conditions and those observed on the road” (ECA 2019). It is evident that there 
was negligence on the part of public-sector actors. “It [a European Parliament inquiry into Dieselgate] exposes a 
culture of looking the other way: the European Commission and member states turned a blind eye to industry-wide 
abuse of the system for emission regulation, and, in fact, even invited the car industry to shape the regulatory 
agenda and its enforcement. […] Companies’ commercial interests were prioritized over public interests” (Hubner 
2017). 
The lack of good governance is astonishing in this case. There was no EU oversight of vehicle type approval, and 
little oversight by the national governments responsible for implementing the law. Carmakers that heavily influence 
political decision-making through this industry’s potent lobbying pressure were the most powerful actors, 
persuading politicians to support their cause (Hubner 2017). What might better governance look like in this context? 
To grasp how it was possible for a scandal of this magnitude to occur, it is necessary to take a few steps back and 
review how the EU system of regulating car gas emissions worked (and, in great part, still works), along with its 
major flaws. 
The European Commission sets the rules on how much pollution a car is allowed to produce. Framework Directive 
2007/46/EC on type approval sets out the safety and environmental requirements that motor vehicles have to 
comply with before being placed on the EU market (European Parliament 2007). “Before a new model of vehicle 
can be sold in the EU, the manufacturer must submit it to the ‘type approval’ process. This process certifies that a 
vehicle prototype meets all EU safety, environmental and production requirements” (ECA 2019). The job of 
enforcing those rules falls to national governments (specifically, to the so-called type-approval authorities). Within 
this enforcement structure, it is possible to identify the core factors that enabled the Volkswagen (and other 
automakers) emission scandal to happen in the first place.  
Let us take a closer look at Germany's Federal Motor Transport Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt, KBA), which sits 
under the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, to see how enforcement of the law works in 
practical terms. One general observation would be that competition between various member states’ type-approval 
authorities makes governance more difficult. Under the current system, an automaker preparing to release a new 
model can choose which country certifies it; every EU nation must then honor this approval once granted. “Although 
common rules on type approval and test specifications are laid down, many witnesses highlighted the existence of 
a variety of interpretations in their application across the member states” (Gieseke and Gerbrandy 2017). Thus, a 
savvy carmaker can select a location in which it provides many jobs (and where officials are likely to be more pliant), 
or choose an authority based on its flexibility in interpreting the rules (Gardiner 2019; Gieseke and Gerbrandy 
2017). This means that KBA did not have a monopoly with regard to its regulatory task, and it was easy for car 
companies that wanted to put new cars on the road to go elsewhere. This rule creates a competition-based incentive 
that significantly impairs good governance. 
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Another pertinent observation is that within the EU, there seems to be a lack of willingness to create institutions 
that both have the power to govern and the enforcement capability needed to give strength to pollution rules. 
National enforcement agencies are generally understaffed, poorly funded and lacking in technical expertise 
(Gardiner 2019; Gieseke and Gerbrandy 2017). Therefore, the European air-quality regulators do not have the clout 
or the resources needed to enforce the law properly. For instance, a significant part of KBA’s budget comes from 
licensing fees gained from awarding cars their new car certificates. This practice urgently needs to be changed, as 
it creates incentives to be “nice” to carmakers. “The fact that type-approval authorities and technical services are 
usually financed in part by fees paid directly to them by the car manufacturers can give rise to conflicts of interest 
due to the need to maintain commercial relations” (Gieseke and Gerbrandy 2017). 
Further problematic issues are related to the identity of those doing the testing and those who pay for it. The majority 
of member states designate technical services to test and inspect new car models (therefore, outsourcing such 
services). KBA, for instance, had no testing facilities of its own.7 “These [type-approval] authorities give 
accreditation to technical services (TSs), which are the bodies that actually test vehicles. The technical services 
may carry out tests at their own facilities (if they have them) or on car manufacturers’ premises” (ECA 2019). 
Usually, it is the car manufacturer that chooses the technical service to be used, and tests are often carried out in 
the car manufacturers’ certified laboratories under the supervision of the designated technical service. This is called 
“self-testing,” and allows car manufacturers to test components in their own laboratories, giving them control over 
the testing conditions. “Approval would depend simply on the manufacturer providing the paperwork to the national 
authority” (Hubner 2017). 
Additionally, when a manufacturer is preparing the launch of a new model on the EU market, the technical services 
that perform the official type-approval testing are paid directly by car manufacturers (Gieseke and Gerbrandy 2017; 
Hubner 2017). These financial and technical links between technical services and manufacturers can lead to 
conflicts of interest and compromise the independence of testing. Moreover, some technical services also do 
consultancy work for manufacturers on emission tests. Beyond that, the specifics of the tests – information on 
tested speed, acceleration, and so on – are publicly available (Gardiner 2019). Thus, a manufacturer can build its 
cars to produce little pollution under those particular conditions, while allowing them to emit much more the rest of 
the time. 
National enforcement agencies’ inability to enforce legal requirements remains a serious issue. According to 
Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council on type approval of motor vehicles with 
respect to emissions, manufacturers are supposed to provide independent operators with unrestricted and 
standardized access to vehicle repair and maintenance information, including the software calibration identification 
number applicable to each relevant vehicle type (European Parliament 2007). Sadly, Volkswagen and most large 
car companies have refused to let third parties, including the KBA, look inside their software, claiming this to be an 
issue of market competitiveness. An EU Parliament report points out that type-approval authorities do not have 
access to electronic control unit (ECU) source code under the current system, although the same report questions 
the effectiveness of such access: “Experts have noted the consensus view that the preemptive checking and 
possible detection of a fraudulent emissions-system defeat device through unrestricted access to the vehicle’s 
proprietary software is not a viable method, due to the extreme complexity of such software” (Gieseke and 
Gerbrandy 2017). 
Additionally, data on car type-approval testing in the EU, such as the results of emission tests, are fragmented 
(ECA 2019). Neither the EU Commission nor the member states have a comprehensive view of such information. 
In general, existing data are kept at the member-state level. “[T]he lack of data transparency and public availability 
make the situation harder for interested parties to follow the issue and to contribute to the monitoring of vehicle 
emissions” (ECA 2019). 
 
7 Hearing featuring Kraftfahrt Bundesamt (KBA) President Ekhard Zinke in 2016: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/110300/CRE_EMIS_%2011%2010%202016_EN.pdf. Accessed on 22 October 2019. 
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Lastly, another important issue in understanding the failure to implement this legislation properly is the absence of 
external testing options enabling outside parties to analyze the software. Car owners were not able to look inside 
their cars and understand what the various components were doing; nor could they have an expert look inside 
these components. If they had the legal right to do so, this scandal would likely have been uncovered much earlier. 
The main state actors engaged in this digitalization process, the national governments as represented by their type-
approval authorities, were fundamentally unable to shape the process. They lacked the necessary human and 
financial resources, as well as access to the relevant technology necessary to perform in-house testing, instead 
having to rely on tests performed in the car manufacturers’ certified laboratories under the supervision of technical 
services. In many cases related to self-driving vehicles, KBA still lacks access to all relevant software. In addition, 
the competitive structure at the EU level enabled an unpleasant form of “race to the bottom” governance, leaving 
EU and national regulators alike in a position in which they were unable to govern effectively. “The Dieselgate 
scandal has lifted the lid on a culture of industry self-regulation and light-touch rulemaking that is facilitated by 
European decision-makers, including member states” (Hubner 2017). 
In January 2016, following the Dieselgate exposures, the Commission proposed a fundamental reform of the 
vehicle type-approval system, replacing Directive 2007/46/EC in an attempt to tackle the perceived shortcomings 
of the current EU system (EU Commission 2018). The new rules were approved by the European Parliament in 
April 2018 (Regulation (EU) 2018/858), and will become mandatory beginning in September 2020. From this point 
forward, European regulators will require cars to be tested on the road, and not just in the lab. But it seems clear 
that the flaws in European nations’ enforcement extend beyond the particulars of any given testing method. The 
problem lies in the system itself; moreover, with regard to important aspects of this problem, the EU Commission’s 
effort to improve the system has failed to make significant strides forward. 
To be sure, progress has been made in some areas. In the future, technical services will be regularly and 
independently audited, manufacturers will be obliged to disclose data necessary for third-party testing, type-
approval authorities and technical services will granted access to vehicle software, member states will ensure that 
there is enough national funding available in each country to test a minimum number of vehicles (the so-called 
market surveillance checks), member states will be subject to greater scrutiny, and the EU will expand its oversight 
of the vehicle type-approval process (specifically, the EU Commission will be able to suspend and withdraw type 
approvals, and impose penalties on manufacturers) (ECA 2019; EU Commission 2018; ICCT 2018). According to 
the EU Commission press release: 
They will have to review regularly the functioning of their market surveillance activities and make the results 
publicly available. National type-approval authorities will be subject to peer evaluations if they assess their 
own technical services instead of the national accreditation bodies, but they will always be subject to an 
independent assessment carried out directly by the Commission to ensure that the relevant rules are 
implemented and enforced rigorously across the EU (EU Commission 2018). 
However, the official type-approval testing will still be paid for directly by car manufacturers, producing conflicts of 
interest and compromising the independence of the testing process. The Commission proposed a modification of 
the remuneration system, but this element was not approved (EU Commission 2018). “To avoid any potential 
conflict of interest and reinforce the independence of testing, a type-approval fee structure was considered to cover 
the costs of all type-approval tests and inspections carried out by the technical services. However, the European 
Parliament and the EU member states rejected this part of the EC’s proposal” (ICCT 2018). Additionally, another 
aspect originally proposed by the EU Commission (and supported by NGOs and consumer associations) – the 
creation of an EU-wide type-approval authority –was not included in the final regulation (ICCT 2018). 
It will still be necessary to reinforce the independence and quality of testing and strengthen the overall type-approval 
system through greater European oversight. “In addition, thorough implementation of any of the adopted measures 
in practice will also require that member states provide sufficient financial resources for their type-approval bodies” 
(ICCT 2018). Or, in other words, as the EU Parliament report recognizes, “The presence of adequate in-house 
Page 24 | Governance of digitalization: Failing forward? Four case studies 
 
independent, qualified human resources and the availability of in-house state-of-the-art testing facilities are 
essential to ensuring effective monitoring of the emission standards” (Gieseke and Gerbrandy 2017).  
Ultimately, proper governance would be possible only with an independent and properly publicly funded KBA whose 
decisions were not subject to influence by a government minister. Moreover, consumer protection groups need 
better access to all relevant information in order to be able to play a watchdog role, and to be able to lobby effectively 
in consumers’ favor. Car owners should be able to look inside and understand their own cars, and should be able 
to secure the services of external testing providers. Success should not require the emergence of intermittent scan-
dals around such an important issue. Rather, it should be a question of systematic and regular reporting in this 
area.     
6.3 The internet multistakeholder governance model 
As mentioned previously, we utilise the concept of "internet governance" as formulated by the Working Group on 
Internet Governance. As such, we understand it as "the development and application by governments, the private 
sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures 
and programs that shape the evolution and use of the internet" (WGIG 2005). To understand the multistakeholder 
model of global internet governance and the role of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) within it, it is first 
necessary to take a few steps back and recall the history of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN).  
ICANN was created in 1998, “emerg[ing] from a struggle over control of the internet’s domain name system (DNS)” 
(Mueller and Wagner 2014). At that time, according to the authors, the internet was becoming a public mass 
medium globally, and there was no clear, legitimate policymaking body with authority over the central coordinating 
functions of the internet’s underlying routing and address system. In response, the United States initiated a process 
to address the institutional problem of DNS governance: “The idea was to use a private-sector non-profit dominated 
by the technical community to govern DNS by private contract rather than public regulation or treaties” (Mueller and 
Wagner 2014). In this case, a private-sector governance authority was deemed helpful in order to circumvent the 
fear that national governments would impose their own domestic laws and regulations on the global arena of the 
internet. However, from its beginning, ICANN struggled to achieve collective legitimacy over this new institutional 
framework. One of the problematic factors was justifying the contention that ICANN was global while it was in fact 
headquartered in California and functioned under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding drafted by the 
U.S. Commerce Department. This factor kept ICANN under the shadow of U.S. hegemony, preventing other states 
or institutions from becoming overly influential (Wagner 2016b). 
In an effort to win other countries’ support for the ICANN model, the institution included stakeholders from different 
countries and various types of organizations in its operations, a concept that afterward became known as the 
multistakeholder governance model. The concept of multistakeholder internet governance suggests that civil 
society groups, the business community, governments, and technical and academic experts all make decisions 
together, rather than these decisions being made by states alone (Cammaerts and Padovani 2006; Chapelle 2008; 
Hintz 2007; Wagner 2016b). In the sense that it claims to involve all participants in the decision-making process by 
sharing decision-making power with non-state actors, the multistakeholder governance model can be considered 
an innovative governance concept, although it raises serious issues of legitimacy, representativeness and 
accountability (Bendiek and Wagner 2012; Mueller 2010; Mueller and Wagner 2014; Wagner 2016b).  
Private-sector actors play a key role in this DNS governance structure, as they are responsible for the technical 
standards that create the global basis for communication on the internet. Although the early institutional design of 
ICANN intentionally excluded governments from decision-making positions, a Governmental Advisory Committee 
(GAC) was created at the group’s Berlin meeting in 1999, with the intention of allowing states to influence the 
decision-making process (Mueller and Wagner 2014). However, “despite this claim of inclusion of a broad group of 
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stakeholders from many different countries, the early ICANN quite evidently reflected the preferences of both the 
U.S. government and their allies” (Wagner 2016b). 
Over time, a number of different actors have been critical of this multistakeholder global internet technical 
governance model. At the forefront of the international organizations seeking a role in internet governance has 
been the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United Nations-affiliated body that has helped lead 
advocacy for an intergovernmental approach to internet policy (Mueller and Wagner 2014; Wagner 2016b). The 
ITU helped organize the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) process, a United Nations-sponsored 
set of discussions aimed initially at ensuring that the developing world was able to participate in the internet’s 
benefits. It was at the second major set of WSIS meetings in Tunisia in 2005 that the first major, open challenges 
to ICANN’s role by developing countries and Europe emerged (Mueller 2010), led by non-OECD countries 
concerned about U.S. control over the internet. This conflict had several immediate outcomes.  
With regard to ICANN specifically, the Tunis Agenda, a consensus statement that emerged from the WSIS Tunisia 
summit, ended up empowering the group’s GAC. Though many issues regarding U.S. control of ICANN were left 
unsolved, this gave a significantly greater role to the governmental representatives within the ostensibly private-
sector organization (Mueller and Wagner 2014; Wagner 2016b). Separately, the 2005 WSIS participants also 
agreed on the creation of an annual multistakeholder forum at which policy-related topics could be discussed on a 
non-binding basis. This ultimately became the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), that should be governed in a 
multistakeholder manner like the ICANN. At this point, the discussion of DNS governance expanded to the 
discussion of Internet governance as a whole, going beyond the technical aspects and entering the high policy 
level. 
While an apparent step forward in bringing international voices into the decision-making mix, the IGF was never 
endowed with instrumental power of any kind, making it difficult for this body to initiate or push through 
improvements in global internet governance. “Its purpose is to anchor the existing multistakeholder model of 
internet governance, at an international level, rather than to distribute instrumental power” (Wagner 2016b). 
Nevertheless, it has acted over the years as the nexus for a transnational network of actors (Flyverbom 2011), 
serving as an effective community-building and socialization mechanism (Franklin 2013; Mueller 2010; Mueller and 
Wagner 2014). For its part, the ITU continued to support the annual WSIS forum as its chosen policy framework, 
effectively in competition with the IGF. However, like the IGF, the WSIS draws its legitimacy from the Tunis Agenda 
(Wagner 2016b). 
From the internet governance perspective, the primary function of the IGF seems to be a symbolic one. “While 
neither accountable nor effective in changing governance practices, these [internet] institutions nonetheless serve 
to justify ongoing internet governance practices at an international level” (Wagner 2016b). Secondly, another 
important function has been “institutional lock-in” (Wagner 2016b), preventing other institutions from governing the 
internet or contesting existing governance practices. Finally, a third component is related to “the strong split 
between legitimizing public front-stage process and the backstage power-allocation process. While the front stage 
is steeped in public symbolism and ritual, the latter is where power over governance practices resides” (Wagner 
2016b). There is scarcely a tangible link between the front stage debates and the actual internet governance 
practices of the individual actors. “The IGF with its rituals, forums and symbolic interaction often seems more 
theatrical than oriented on producing a specific policy outcome” (Mueller and Wagner 2014). 
After 2005, there was a proliferation of national and regional internet governance forums at various levels and on 
multiple topics, such as the Freedom Online Coalition and the London Cyberspace process. To a certain degree, 
all of these efforts were contesting the authority of the IGF as the central global forum for internet governance. 
“Crucially, neither key developing nations nor many international organizations within the UN system were happy 
with the IGF occupying a central role in the development of international internet policy. Even if the IGF had no 
[real] power, they feared that it might erode their own relevance and legitimacy within the international system” 
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(Mueller and Wagner 2014). The result has been to push the IGF to the fringes of the core debates on internet 
policy. 
The authority of the IGF to “govern” the internet was strongly contested by the ITU in 2012 during the World 
Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT). The WCIT showed that the legitimacy of the current 
global model of internet governance was being questioned globally, and demonstrated that there was no 
international consensus on the appropriateness of this model. However, while the actual usage of the Internet has 
shifted, ICANN became increasingly irrelevant as an institution (Wagner, 2016b). Likewise, the lock-in function of 
the IGF and ICANN decreased considerably. “Multistakeholder institutions like the IGF and ICANN are increasingly 
becoming empty shells to justify a model with little international buy-in” (Wagner 2016b). As a result, the 
multistakeholder model of internet governance has devolved into a theatrical performance with little influence on 
actual practices of internet governance (van Eeten and Mueller 2012; Hintz 2007; Mueller 2010; Wagner 2016b) 
despite claims to the contrary (Cammaerts and Padovani 2006; Chapelle 2008; Flyverbom 2011). So how to get 
from these empty institutional shells to actual governance in practice? 
There are at least two clearly opposed groups of actors shaping, or fighting to shape, the process of internet 
governance. The recurring attempts over several decades to develop legitimacy and principles for internet 
governance have revealed ongoing and as yet unresolved tensions; in large part, these stem from the fact that the 
internet’s technical governance remains largely dominated by Western multistakeholder institutions (ICANN, IGF, 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), etc.), even as nation-states (including 
a large number of developing countries, as well as important emerging economies such as China, Russia, Brazil 
and South Africa) and UN-oriented intergovernmental institutions have demanded a more significant role. This latter 
group has long been trying to strengthen the ITU’s role in internet governance. 
The United States’ continuing ability to shape this process is a primary reason why the multistakeholder internet 
governance model has persisted. “At the most fundamental level, this model of internet governance continues to 
persist because of sufficient U.S. hegemony over internet infrastructure” (Wagner 2016b). Even though the United 
States’ capacity to wield unilateral control over the technical functioning of the internet has declined over the last 
two decades, it still represents the dominant force holding together the existing internet governance regime. 
The existing multistakeholder internet governance model continues to produce a great deal of meetings. However, 
a number of scholars argue that there is little in the way of real governance being produced (van Eeten and Mueller 
2012), and that the symbolic theatre of ICANN and IGF has little to do with actual governance practices (Wagner 
2016b). These institutions are captured by powerful interests (Milan and Oever 2017), undermining the ostensible 
benefits of the multistakeholder internet governance model. Stakeholders who claim to have a stake within the 
model do not necessarily have actual power. Companies’ dominant role in these institutions needs to be reduced, 
and participation by civil society and academic institutions should be promoted (Voelsen 2019). 
To summarize, the multistakeholder approach as manifested in these organizations is of limited efficacy. There has 
been a lack of effective institutionalization, in the sense that there has been no real agreement within the IGF, 
ICANN or WSIS on how to alter or institutionalize any governance practices or rules for the internet. These 
institutions have become, at worst, a distraction from actual governance and, at best, a weak instrument of 
governance. 
For many years, debates on internet governance itself have focused on a very narrow range of international 
institutions such as ICANN, IGF and WSIS, which have been of questionable importance (due to their limited actual 
authority over internet operations). This has constrained the scope of the overall debate (van Eeten and Mueller 
2012; Wagner 2016b). The field of internet governance is highly interdisciplinary, and a plausible explanation for 
this myopic focus or blind spot might be that “studying a centralized institution is a lot more convenient than having 
to identify and study a wealth of disjointed, messy and globally distributed processes that together produce 
governance” (van Eeten and Mueller 2012:729). Additionally, given the increasing importance of the internet to our 
societies, there is a growing need for accountability, and a concomitant desire to be able to hold centralized and 
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formalized institutions accountable. However, focusing exclusively on these institutions would lead to an 
overestimation of the presence and influence of states in internet governance (van Eeten and Mueller 2012). 
“In most areas, governance of the internet takes place under very different conditions: low formalization, 
heterogeneous organizational forms and technological architectures, large numbers of actors, and massively 
distributed authority and decision-making power. Whatever governance emerges under these conditions, it will be 
a lot less amenable to state intervention” (van Eeten and Mueller 2012:730). Non-hierarchical forms of cooperation 
are the dominant form of governance, supplemented by the factually narrow authority claim of ICANN (Voelsen 
2019). Currently, “the internet is governed by numerous informal power relations and agreements – predominantly 
between private actors. Insofar as public actors are involved, their ability to influence internet governance, at both 
a national and an international level, has been extraordinarily limited” (Wagner 2016b). However, the absence of 
formal hierarchies does not mean that there are no power relations. In particular, companies are trying to enforce 
their interests in bodies such as the IETF (Voelsen 2019). 
The multistakeholder model embodied in the organizations cited above is basically a networked model, but one 
without implementing institutions or co-decision-making. Structurally the multistakeholder model is weak, and lack-
ing regulatory enforcement power. Additionally, as implemented, the model carries issues of legitimacy. Who gets 
to represent which constituency, and based on what type of legitimation process? For example, business stake-
holders are not democratically elected, unlike state actors. Yet those present are able to wield direct influence over 
the debate within the multistakeholder model. For this reason, to deal with the internet governance a better ap-
proach might be to start with a networked approach at the government level, and then integrate non-state actors 
through classical co-decision-making procedures that are easily institutionalized, such as request-for-comment pro-
cesses, public consultations and public hearings. Essentially, the multistakeholder model is not able to produce the 
strong institutions needed for actual internet governance. Rather, a networked model of regulation, and specifically 
one in which public actors would take responsibility and lead a process of democratic governance, seems to be the 
best approach. In this regard, questions such as the appropriate limits of involvement for non-state actors — par-
ticularly powerful companies — still need to be addressed. 
6.4 The pending European platform regulation proposal and the Digital Services 
Act 
The EU Commission is currently considering the creation of a new authority for the regulation of online services. 
This option was one of several contained in an internal European Commission note on the issue that was leaked 
in July 2019. The proposed Digital Services Act (DSA) or Digital Service Code would affect “all digital services in 
the Single Market, in particular online platforms […] such as social media, search engines or collaborative economy 
services, as well as […] online advertising services” (EU Commission 2019). In the note, the Commission presented 
current problems posed by the regulation of digital services, and proposed a number of measures that would update 
the regulatory framework for digital services, including a revision of the existing E-Commerce Directive (ECD). The 
paper was written by officials in the Commission’s Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and 
Technology (DG Connect). It was part of a discussion process moving toward the development of a more detailed 
proposal to be brought forward by the new Commission, which took office in Brussels in December 2019. 
The new Act is intended to create European rules addressing issues such as online hate speech within social 
networks, transparency in online political advertising, disinformation campaigns and e-commerce fairness. 
According to the note, these issues are complicated by multiple sets of divergent rules across the various EU 
member states, increasingly uncoordinated national or even regional regulation, and an absence of standards for 
information exchange between local and national authorities. The note’s authors argue that this fragmented 
regulatory environment makes it difficult for newcomers to compete and survive. “Even if consumer rules, data 
protection rules […] and contract rules have converged across the EU, in today's regulatory environment, only the 
big platform companies can grow and survive,” it states. This situation is considered to be a “major strategic 
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weakness for the EU in the digital economy,” and a competitive disadvantage in comparison to non-EU services. 
The authors cite the example of Estonian start-up Taxify (now known as Bolt), which has had difficulties in scaling 
up across the EU and in growing to compete effectively with U.S.-based rivals such as Uber. 
This “regulatory gap” is recognized by the EU Commission within the note when stating “there is currently no 
dedicated "platform regulator” in the EU, which could exercise effective oversight and enforcement, e.g. in areas 
such as content moderation or advertising transparency.” In their analysis, the authors observe that there is 
currently no regulatory authority available to provide quick and reliable EU-wide guidance on emerging and 
unforeseen issues, although the note recognizes that sectoral digital services regulators already exist in the areas 
of data protection, audiovisual media, competition, electronic communication services and consumer protection.  
The note also posits a need for the EU to address the current self-regulation model for online platforms. These 
platforms are making “public-interest decisions that should be taken by independent public authorities, […] without 
adequate and necessary oversight, even in areas where fundamental rights are at stake,” the authors write. 
The document outlines a complete overhaul of the rules governing the net. “The nature of such an instrument 
should support its overall aim to update, clarify and harmonize rules for digital services in the Single Market, which 
could potentially mean that the directive should evolve into a regulation.” The main structural components would 
build on the existing blocks of the ECD. A revised set of rules would “complement” recently adopted sector-specific 
rules such as the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), the New Deal for Consumers, and other 
regulations on the issues of copyright, terrorist content, explosives precursors and child sexual abuse. 
This ambitious EU Commission initiative faces a number of challenges. The potential confusion created by housing 
multiple institutional roles within a single institutional platform regulator is only one of these. Although the leaked 
note is just an initial step in a longer process of debate, its text produces major concerns. For example, it lacks 
specificity with regard to how platforms would be compelled or convinced to comply with the new rules. The 
relationship between a possible new platform regulator and existing regulatory bodies (national tax offices, existing 
platform regulators like the German BfJ, etc.) would require considerable thought and institutional engineering. 
Ensuring proper coordination across instruments (AVMSD, copyright, terrorist content) will be another challenge. 
The details of all these issues remain vague in the leaked note. However, the text does list different options for 
monitoring compliance with the rules. With regard to regulatory oversight in particular, it says that the new Digital 
Services Act (DSA) could create a new “central regulator,” but that there could also be a “decentralized system” or 
“an extension of powers of existing regulatory authorities.” The degree of independence that any such new 
regulatory agency would have, along with the possible roles and powers associated with the regulatory structure, 
still need to be clarified. Outstanding issues include reporting requirements, powers to require additional 
information, complaint handling policies, the power to impose fines or other corrective actions, and the approval of 
codes of conduct, just to name a few. Thus, the governance challenge ahead is enormous. What might better 
governance in this area look like? 
As relevant actors in this regulation process, we have the institutions of the European Union (the European 
Commission, Council and Parliament) trying to prove they can govern large platforms. Civil society is playing a role 
insofar as it is pushing for stronger regulation, especially (but not only) regarding social media, its influence on 
elections, and its role in spreading hate speech and misinformation. Global platforms, in turn, are resisting 
collaboration to the extent that they have failed to develop automated content moderation systems with the desired 
degree of transparency and accountability, for example, or transparency with regard to algorithmic recommendation 
systems of public relevance, such as newsfeeds. 
Individuals within the European Union – that is, those who are most deeply affected by the misbehavior of online 
platforms – are the key actors who are not directly involved in shaping this process, but should be. European 
citizens are confused and suffering from the lack of regulation and governance of online services, often to the extent 
of seeing their fundamental rights and freedoms abridged. Among those experiencing the most harm are ethnic, 
racial and religious minorities; people who face discrimination based on sexual orientation or disabilities; 
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marginalized communities (particularly those who do not speak European languages); underprivileged citizens; and 
women. 
The EU regulatory impetus fits into the broader Von der Leyen agenda, marked by the new Commission president’s 
aim to demonstrate the ability to govern Europe. As a result, efforts to regulate may overshoot what is possible or 
practicable. The EU is likely to employ all its force to prove it can regulate global platforms, seeking to become a 
model worldwide. On the other hand, large platforms will certainly use their power to try to influence the decision-
making process to soften any proposed regulations (favoring a “soft-touch” approach) or to recast the proposals in 
their favor. At this stage, it remains unclear how civil society and individual citizens will seek to ensure their voice 
is heard, what mechanisms they will use, or indeed whether they will be heard at all. 
Based on the information currently available, the Commission appears to be positioning the DSA as a case in which 
state regulation properly takes over from an earlier process of self-regulation. However, the self-regulation regime 
was not developed voluntarily, but under conditions in which there was a lack of satisfactory regulation at the EU 
level. In this sense, it is a classic case of the EU moving slowly while the individual member states have speed 
ahead. It appears that this proposed law is being positioned to supplant self-regulatory approaches, both in the 
sense of superseding national-level approaches, and by reducing online platforms’ freedom to regulate themselves. 
However, Germany has already passed its NetzDG law governing some of these issues, and France is developing 
its own digital platform laws (French Government 2019). This creates a problematic situation in which EU will have 
to carefully manage the interrelation between these national laws and the new EU platform law. Moreover, a number 
of EU-driven self-regulatory efforts regarding hate speech, illegal content, online crime prevention and the 
prevention of material relating to child sexual abuse have all been implemented prior to this new EU regulatory 
push, creating another significant challenge with regard to ensuring proper coordination across instruments. 
The leaked EU Commission note was criticized by various sources. European Digital Rights (EDRi), an association 
of civil and human rights organizations from across Europe, remarked that “from a fundamental rights perspective, 
the internal note contains a few good proposals, a number of bad ones, and one pretty ugly” (EDRi 2019).  
As an example of a “good” proposal, the group notes that “the Commission maintains that no online platform should 
be forced to actively monitor all user-uploaded content.” As the Commission states, this prohibition of general 
monitoring obligations is a “foundational cornerstone” of internet regulation. According to EDRi, this type of policy 
“has allowed the internet to become a place for everyone to enjoy the freedom of expression and communicate 
globally without having to go through online gatekeepers.” But EDRi’s analysis points out that the note is somewhat 
weak on the issue of automated filtering technologies (Wagner 2014), since the leaked text merely recommends 
that transparency and accountability should be “considered” when algorithmic filters are used. “It’s no secret though 
that filtering algorithms make too many mistakes – they do not understand context, political activism or satire” (EDRi 
2019). Creating more transparency around the algorithmic decisions made by large online platforms would 
undoubtedly be welcome. However, this is not enough to prevent fundamental rights violations and discrimination. 
EDRi is more critical of the note’s proposal that the Commission analyze policy options for both illegal and 
potentially “harmful” but legal content. EDRi indicates that harmful content lacks a legal definition, and “it is unclear 
which content should be considered ‘harmful’ and who makes that call.” The Commission authors acknowledge 
that when platform companies are pushed to take measures against potentially illegal and harmful content, their 
effort to balance interests often pushes them to overblock legal speech and monitor people’s communications in 
order to evade legal liability. However, the note also suggests that harmful content can be best dealt with through 
the use of voluntary codes of conduct, which shifts the regulatory burden to the platform companies and decreases 
legal certainty for users (EDRi 2019). 
According to EDRi, the “ugly” proposal relates to modifying platform operators’ traditional exemption from liability 
for user-uploaded content. Currently, under the EU E-Commerce Directive, platform operators are not liable for 
illegal content uploaded by users as long as they can claim to have been unaware of the content, and remove it as 
soon as they are requested to do so. In other words, under Article 14 of the ECD, providers are liable for illegal 
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content uploaded by users, such as copyright infringements, only if they were previously aware of this content and 
do not remove it after being requested to do so. “Services such as Facebook, Flickr or YouTube would probably be 
unthinkable otherwise” (Rudl and Fanta 2019). Yet this could change under the new DSA. The note proposes to 
distinguish between providers, and in some cases to prescribe “proactive measures” in order to avoid direct liability 
(that is, creating a duty to proactively monitor and search for certain types of content in order to prevent its upload). 
“Such measures could include upload filters, as required by the recently adopted EU copyright reform” (Rudl and 
Fanta 2019). For EDRi, the question that remains unanswered here is: “How can the Commission save the current 
liability exemption for the sake of internet users and their fundamental rights, all the while making it compatible with 
the hair-raising provisions of the Copyright Directive?” The Commission needs to engage in a transparent 
discussion of how the liability exemption can be salvaged, how the negative impacts of the sectoral laws can be 
dealt with, and how to avoid collateral damage. It must also be careful to preserve the liability exemption for the 
sake of freedom of speech online. 
As noted above, the prospective governance challenges are substantial in this case, since there are numerous 
actors involved at different levels (national, international, supranational and sub-national) and in diverse sectoral 
areas, along with multiple sets of sectoral laws to be considered and coordinated. In the interest of achieving 
satisfactory governance, a decentralized system would seem to be more appropriate. An independent set of 
European-level regulators (dealing with a wide set of relevant areas such as political campaigning and elections, 
online speech, urban mobility, data protection, audiovisual media, electronic communication services, consumer 
protection, among others), acting in concert with a set of national regulators, would seem to be beneficial. 
Democratic governance will be achieved only if the EU manages to create a regulatory model in which both civil 
society and online platforms (both large and small) have space to be heard, and can have their concerns and input 
considered. 
Measuring the success or failure of this potential new EU authority for the regulation of online services will be 
difficult. Relevant indicators may be similar to those being used for Germany’s NetzDG law in some areas, but may 
well be distinct in other areas. These decisions will depend on the final extent and scope of the platform regulation, 
which has yet to be defined.
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7 Why are many digital governance initiatives failing? 
The notions of steering and collaboration seem to be common to most definitions of governance, in general, and 
of technology governance in particular (Ackerman 2004; Barnett and Duvall 2005; van Eeten and Mueller 2012; 
WGIG 2005). However, the case studies examined in this report illustrate that these notions can be extremely hard 
to implement in practice. What can we learn from these cases? Why are many digital governance initiatives failing? 
The German Network Enforcement law (NetzDG) and the automobile (software) emissions scandal are examples 
of a failure to implement digitalization governance properly through institutions. In both cases, regulatory institutions 
exist: Germany’s Federal Office of Justice (Bundesamt für Justiz, BfJ) in the case of the NetzDG, and Germany's 
Federal Motor Transport Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt, KBA) in the case of the automobile scandal. However, 
neither entity is sufficiently independent nor receives funding sufficient to carry out its assigned tasks. Therefore, 
they lack both the power to govern and the needed enforcement capability. 
The case of the multistakeholder global internet governance model deals with a proposal that at first seemed 
innovative and promising, but ultimately failed to produce actual governance. While a networked model of regulation 
seems the correct approach, the multistakeholder model was unsuccessful in achieving its goal; that is, it was not 
able to effectively include representative actors from different countries and sectors (civil society, the business 
community, governments, and technical and academic experts) and there is no shared decision-making power 
among participants. The major institutions that use this model (ICANN) and the annual multistakeholder forum (the 
IGF, which was never endowed with real policymaking power) are focused on “performing” governance. As such, 
they are preventing other institutions from emerging to contest existing governance practices and question these 
organizations’ monopoly within this area.  
This model is doomed to fail, as a number of different actors and forums have questioned the authority of the IGF 
as the central global forum for internet governance. In short, the model raises serious issues of legitimacy, 
representativeness and accountability. Multistakeholderism is limited in its approach, and is a weak instrument for 
governance, as it has proved unable to produce the strong institutions or facilitate the co-decision-making practices 
needed for actual internet governance. For the implementation of a truly democratic governance model, the role of 
powerful companies must be reduced. Crucially, public-sector actors must take primary responsibility for 
safeguarding governance and human rights, and therefore lead the process. 
Finally, in the case of the Digital Services Act (DSA), if the EU Commission opts to create a new central platform 
regulator tasked with multiple responsibilities rather than a “decentralized system,” it faces the serious risk of 
attempting to build a perfect institution for the regulation of digital platforms and online services, but failing in the 
process of implementation. There are many dangers in seeking to create a central platform regulator, starting with 
the potential for confusion when multiple institutional roles are combined within a single regulatory institution 
platform, and extending to the potential for conflicts of interest across the various areas of digitalization. 
Digital governance seems to be failing in Europe. Public-sector actors at different levels (national, international, 
supranational and subnational) demonstrate a frequent lack of capability or willingness to implement laws and 
regulate effectively. This challenge also appears related to the general unwillingness to create new, truly 
independent regulators. It is much easier to shift responsibility for all digital issues to DPAs or other existing 
government agencies than to acknowledge the true scope and scale of the problem. There is an evident deficiency 
in understanding how technology works; policymakers consistently seem to underestimate the scope of the 
problem, seeking to impose temporary fixes rather than durable solutions. Therefore, it appears that the stumbling-
blocks are primarily institutional. 
The recent case of the Irish Data Protection Commission’s (DPC) budget is an example of the general lack of 
willingness among public-sector actors to create independent and strong regulators. In the 2020 budgeting process, 
the DPC received less than a third of the additional funding it sought (Taylor 2019). Its requests reflected the 
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significant increase in the agency’s workload due to implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). Under the reduced budget outlay, the DPC will have to reassess its planned expenditure for next year and 
cope with an overload of work while trying to maintain efficient operations. 
It is urgent that the EU takes the digitalization process into its own hands. To this end, it is necessary to create 
new, genuinely independent public authorities. In the context of this report, independent means that the regulatory 
body is adequately funded with its own budget, is a part of the public sector, and is able to act with complete 
independence, which in turns implies a decision-making power independent of any direct or indirect external influ-
ence. In this regard, the supervisory authorities must be able to ensure swift and effective impartial public decision-
making within their relevant regulatory framework. In other words, any such body must have institutional independ-
ence, rather than being subject to partisan political influence that affects its ability to make impartial decisions. It 
should have access to the human and financial resources needed to perform its assigned tasks, as well as to any 
relevant necessary technology. Only then will the regulators have the enforcement capability required to govern. 
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8 What might “better” governance of digitalization look like? 
Efforts to govern digitalization processes are often difficult, messy and defined by globally distributed processes. 
This is a particularly complex task because it involves actors from many different sectors (public, private, civil 
society, academia, etc.), among other reasons. Frequently, these actors do not share the same level of knowledge 
regarding technology, and do not have equal access to technological resources. Public-sector actors are commonly 
at a disadvantage because governments generally invest more slowly in technology than do private companies, for 
various reasons. In addition, the political dynamics of states progress at a different pace than do business 
negotiations, defined as they are by the formation of alliances, the making of laws, budget approval debates, 
multistakeholder discussions, and routine considerations of a wide variety of interests. These and other factors can 
make discussions and approvals slow and complicated.  
Against this backdrop, this section of the report focuses on how “better” governance of digitalization processes in 
Europe might function. In it, we will develop a proposal for a digitalization governance model that draws on the 
example of the EU Commission’s Digital Services Act (DSA), which – though it remains in the discussion stage, 
and has not yet been officially proposed – has raised the prospect of a new authority tasked with regulation of all 
digital services in the Single Market, and of online platforms in particular. The Commission’s current discussions 
offer a useful opportunity to reflect on how digitalization governance efforts could be rendered more effective. This 
occasion is particularly valuable both because the relevant policymaking process remains underway (potentially 
leaving room for further input), and because the debate encompasses state regulation of digitalization processes 
overall, rather than being focused on a specific area of the digital world, such as online speech. 
Therefore, we consider here how the EU DSA might be conceptualized in light of the governance flaws analyzed 
in the case studies presented in this report. In other words, if we had the opportunity to develop a template for the 
DSA, what might it look like?  
The governance challenges that will face any EU DSA are substantial, as its implementation will engage numerous 
actors at different levels (national, international, supranational and subnational) and in diverse sectoral areas, and 
will require the consideration and coordination of a large set of sectoral laws. One option would be the creation of 
a central digital regulator, similar to the approach proposed by the UK House of Lords. However, this option risks 
entangling many of the separate but overlapping policy issues associated with platform regulation, creating 
unnecessary institutional tensions; for instance, there will be numerous issues in which the interests of freedom of 
expression and privacy collide, or where platform governance and human rights do not align well with internal inner-
agency debates (Wagner 2011). In other words, digital platforms and the field of digital services more generally are 
characterized by the intersection of a large number of different areas with conflicting interests. This would produce 
a significant number of conflicts of interests that a central regulator could not, and in some cases should not, resolve 
internally. Particularly given the importance of national and regional regulators in implementing regulation in a wide 
variety of areas, these regulators should be involved at as early a stage as possible 
The European Union’s data-protection regulatory regime offers useful lessons in this regard. Here, there are 
independent national regulators, in some cases also subnational regulators, and the European-level regulator, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). The EDPS is an independent supervisory authority responsible for 
ensuring that EU institutions and bodies comply with data-protection law when processing personal data.8 All these 
regulators also work together in the context of a European-level body. Previously, this advisory body was called 
the Article 29 Working Party (A29WP). On 25 May 2018, under the provisions of the EU GDPR, this was replaced 
by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB).  
 
8 For more see: https://edps.europa.eu/about-edps_en 
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The EDPB is an independent European body composed mainly of representatives of the national data-protection 
authorities and the EDPS, and is focused on promoting cooperation.9  The main function of the Board is to ensure 
the consistent application of the GDPR. To that end, the EDPB can perform tasks such as: issue guidance for 
controllers and processors on aspects of GDPR; determine disputes between national supervisory authorities; 
support businesses ability to comply; advise the Commission on any issue related to the protection of personal 
data in the European Union, among other tasks. The European Commission and – with regard to GDPR-related 
matters – the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority have the right to participate in the 
activities and meetings of the Board, but without voting rights. 
What if we had structures similar to that of the data-protection regime, as described above, for other areas highly 
impacted by digitalization, such as online speech or the efforts to secure free and fair elections in the digital age? 
Under such a model, each relevant area would feature national regulators within each member state, a European-
level regulator and a European board that brought together all relevant actors in that area. Additionally, we propose 
the creation of a Digital Services Act Regulator (DSAR) that would not be focused on any specific area, but would 
be able to bring together different sets of sectoral regulators depending on the topic to be discussed.  
And what would be the role of this DSAR? This new authority would be responsible for the meta-regulation of online 
services in general, coordinating the numerous regulators within the specific digital sectors, without itself engaging 
in traditional rule-making or enforcement activities. It would do this by bringing together the various independent 
authorities and boards (from the national, regional, subnational and European level) within the various sectoral 
areas, facilitating collaboration and joint decisions on various topics within the given legal framework.  
For example, if the topic under discussion was online disinformation, then the relevant authorities in areas such as 
digital campaigns and elections, audiovisual media, online speech, and data protection and privacy, among others, 
would meet under the coordination of the DSAR. These entities would engage in joint actions and make joint 
decisions designed to counter disinformation online, within the legal framework given. The DSAR would also have 
the role of involving civil society and private-sector actors relevant to the topic under discussion; however, these 
actors would not be given decision-making power, participating instead in a more collaborative and advisory 
manner. As a regulatory authority body, the DSAR would not serve a legislative function, but would have the 
authority to raise issues to legislators if deemed necessary. It should also be involved in the regulatory process, 
possibly as a board advising the institutions of the European Union (e.g., the European Commission, Council and 
Parliament). 
In other words, the DSAR would be primarily responsible for coordinating a set of independent, sector-specific 
regulatory authorities. The overall aim would be to update, clarify, harmonize and create rules for digital services 
in the Single Market, particularly for online platforms such as social media, search engines, collaborative-economy 
services and online advertising services. The DSAR would not be a central digital-platform and online-services 
regulator, but a central convener of the European entities performing these regulatory tasks. It would coordinate 
discussions between different independent regulatory networks with the goal of creating European rules on issues 
such as online hate speech in social networks, transparency in online political advertising, disinformation 
campaigns, fairness in e-commerce, content moderation, advertising transparency, and the taxation of digital goods 
and services. 
One institutional component supporting this joint decision-making process could be a DSA Expert Pool (DSA-EP), 
composed of several hundred experts in different subjects. The various national and subnational regulators would 
be given the ability to call upon this pool with essentially no added cost to the individual national-level regulators. 
In other words, the DSAR would provide access to the DSA-EP on a cost-free basis as a means of expanding 
regulators’ in-house capacities. This would mean that the independent regulators could maintain a core internal 
staff while also drawing from this pool of additional expertise as needed.10 This would reduce the need to maintain 
 
9 For more see: https://edpb.europa.eu/about-edpb/about-edpb_en 
10 Thanks to Christoph Geisler (SWP) for the helpful inspiration on this topic. 
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large, full-time teams of specialist computer scientists or lawyers at the national or subnational levels, while still 
giving regulators access to a pool of such expertise for short periods of time.  
The range of sectoral issues that should be considered here is broad, and should be defined by the strength of the 
various sectors’ relationships to digital services; for example, EU regulators would be conceivable in the areas of 
data protection, audiovisual media, electronic communication services, consumer protection, political campaigning 
and elections, online speech, financial services, the environment and urban mobility, among others. The DSAR 
would build on existing structures like the EDPB. Additionally, it would help create new structures where they do 
not yet exist, as in the areas of national election authorities or online-speech authorities, who would need to be 
involved in European debates about disinformation. The creation of independent regulatory networks for each of 
these sectoral areas would help to make the regulation process more efficient. It would require a new set of 
regulators, modelled on DPAs but functioning in other areas.  
In contrast to the multistakeholder governance model discussed above, or to existing EU agency models such as 
the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the governance model we are proposing here would go 
beyond advisory boards and the provision of voluntary consultation and advice; instead, it would embody an 
approach similar to that of the collaboration between the EDPB and the EDPS. However, expanding upon these 
bodies’ current relationship of coordination, we also propose additional co-decision-making mechanisms that would 
vary depending on which areas were involved. Importantly, we argue that decisions should be made using qualified 
majorities among participating regulators, thus ensuring that no individual national regulator would be able to block 
the process entirely.  
In summary, the digital governance model proposed here would create a decentralized system. This system would 
be composed of a set of independent regulators (at the European, regional, national and subnational levels) that 
address a comprehensive set of sectoral areas in which digitalization has a significant impact (such as data 
protection, political campaigning and elections, and urban mobility, among many others). The DSAR would serve 
as a central convening structure that would interface extensively on a daily basis with these independent regulators. 
Whenever it proved necessary to discuss a specific transversal digital topic (such as disinformation or content 
moderation in online platforms), it would bring together and coordinate the relevant actors in that matter, providing 
them with a pool of experts that would support joint decision-making in a process of cross-entity discussion. The 
DSAR would also be responsible for including other relevant actors, such as civil society groups, the business 
community, and technical and academic experts. This would create a forum where these actors would be 
guaranteed to be heard, and where their concerns and input would be considered. 
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The diagram below (Figure 1) offers a visualization of the digitalization governance model that is being discussed 
here.  
 
Figure 1 - Decentralized, networked digitalization governance model for a EU Digital Services Act Regulator 
(DSAR) 
To further clarify this proposal, Figure 2 depicts how this model would work in the case of a discussion on the issue 
of disinformation. Here, the DSAR would convene independent regulators in relevant areas such as political 
campaigns and elections, data protection and privacy, audiovisual media, and online speech. Initially, the DSAR 
would coordinate a process of discussion, information exchange, study and research on the topic, at the level of 
debate and collaboration. In a second phase, the DSAR would coordinate a shift to a decision-making level, where 
joint decisions could be made. Therefore, depending on the issue and the stage of the discussion process, the 
degree of involvement by different regulators would vary (e.g., as the process shifted from the 
collaboration/coordination phase to the decision-making phase). In the diagram, these different layers are identified 
through the use of differently shaded sections.  
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Figure 2 - Decentralized, networked digitalization governance model for a EU Digital Service Act Regulator (DSAR), 
when discussing disinformation 
The newly created agencies (as well as the already existing ones) would need individualized metrics of success 
that could be externally measured. Thus, an external third party should perform systematic audits of the platform 
and digital-services regulatory enforcement system. These agencies would also need to be rigorously accountable 
to EU-level oversight bodies, to national-level authorities and to citizens. Finally, the expense of instituting this 
system will be considerable. The EU should avoid seeking to obtain the necessary financial resources from 
companies or through membership fees. Rather, these expenses should be paid out of the general taxation budget 
in order to ensure independence in decision-making. 
 
Retaining multiple independent regulators in different areas, while tasking the DSAR to serve as a joint decision-
making coordinator for specific topics (such as disinformation or hate speech), would ideally help mitigate the 
conflict of interests that would emerge if these functions were placed within a single institution. Were a unitary 
structure containing these independent agencies to be created, it would force these disputes to take place inside 
the institution, making it difficult to mediate conflicts of interest. It would be easier to find a balance between data-
protection and freedom-of-expression interests, for instance, if the entities concerned with these issues were 
independent instead of fighting for prominence within the bureaucratic structure of a single institution. In other 
words, conflicts between different institutions are preferable to those taking place within an institution. As previously 
noted, the EU’s existing regulatory agencies and the new independent bodies that the DSAR will help to create 
must go beyond simply interfacing at the networking and coordination levels, engaging also in joint decision-making. 
Within the DSAR itself, competences would have to be clearly defined. The entity should have the ability to prioritize 
issues, and must possess mechanisms allowing it to arrive at a definitive decision on what course of action to take 
within a meaningful space of time. 
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The EU Commission is considering the creation of a new authority for the regulation of online services using a 
model entailing a single large European regulator. However, if this new unitary body fails to consider all existing 
actors, it will do a bad job even as it seeks to promote “good” regulation. We propose instead a model that does 
not rely on a central body with traditional regulatory powers. Rather, our alternative would be based on an 
independent set of European regulators each focused on individual online-services sectors, and would promote a 
cooperative relationship between these EU regulators (both new and previously existing) under the coordination of 
the DSAR. While this model would entail a certain amount of institutional and procedural complexity, we believe it 
would ameliorate destructive and distracting tensions inevitable in a unitary agency tasked with overseeing so many 
different areas. 
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9 Conclusion 
What lessons can be learned from this report? First and foremost, we can see that states are not always unable to 
govern processes of digitalization but are very frequently reluctant to do so. There is a considerable implementation 
gap between what states claim to be doing to govern technology and what they are actually doing in practice. In 
many cases, it seems reasonable to ask whether any of these governance structures, such as the IGF, were ever 
designed to provide any meaningful kind of digital governance at all. 
While the creation of structures promoting the interests of industry actors may be considered a reasonable strategy 
when an industry is still in its infancy and does not yet have significant influence on society at large, it would be 
foolish at this point to suggest that the internet industry has not yet matured. If anything, high-tech companies are 
rapidly shifting the definition of what constitutes a “technology” product or service, in the process assimilating many 
existing industries at extraordinary speed. Given these clear shifts, the suggestion that large, established 
technology companies should be treated with a “light-touch” regulatory approach in order to enable innovation and 
growth is patently absurd. 
Of course, this does not imply that any and all regulation is acceptable, but rather that there is an urgent need for 
states to act if they want to play any meaningful role in governing digital technologies. Currently, the vast majority 
of governance activities directed at digital spaces are conducted by the private sector, with little state intervention. 
It is no longer enough for states to claim proudly that they have finally “brought Google to the table,” or are currently 
negotiating with Facebook on yet another nonbinding self-regulatory policy. States should be governing these 
companies.  
To govern effectively in the way we are describing, oversight institutions must have a true ability to regulate. 
Institutions co-funded by industry or which feature industry officials sitting on their decision-making boards cannot 
serve this function, despite their popularity within technology governance circles. Effective governance also 
demands a genuine willingness within the public sector to create regulatory structures with real force, which push 
the technology sector to actually follow the law. Upon examination, many of the measures cited in the case studies 
above seem to be little more than smokescreens, intended to demonstrate that states are acting rather than being 
actual instruments of governance. While this limited efficacy may in large part be due to successful private-sector 
lobbying, this does not change the basic fact that regulators must be able to regulate if states want to remain 
legitimate actors in the area of digital governance. 
This report suggests that it is perfectly possible for nation-states to shape regulatory dynamics more effectively – if 
they take the issue seriously, and are willing to organize a distributed implementation structure. The EU GDPR is 
perhaps the best current example of a serious effort to impose a rigorous governance structure on a broad, cross-
sectoral technological field of activity. The GDPR too could go further and suffers from its own implementation gap. 
Nevertheless, it goes considerably farther in terms of practical governance than does most other regulation in this 
area. 
Only if the EU is willing to implement GDPR-style legislation, along with a corresponding regulatory structure, across 
a comprehensive set of regulatory fields, will the kind of regulatory action and enforcement needed to govern 
digitalization become possible. Policymakers must accept that shaping the future course of digitalization will require 
effective governance, which in turn will depend upon a robust institutional response. States certainly have the ability 
and resources to accomplish this. It remains to be seen whether they will actually be willing to do it.
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11 Abbreviations 
A29WP  Article 29 Working Party 
AfD   Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) 
API  Application Programming Interface 
AVMSD  Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
BfJ   Bundesamt für Justiz (Germany’s Federal Office of Justice) 
DG Connect Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology 
DPAs   Data Protection Authorities 
DPC  Data Protection Commission 
DNS  Domain Name System 
DSA   Digital Services Act 
DSAR  Digital Services Act Regulator 
ECD   E-Commerce Directive 
EDPB   European Data Protection Board  
EDPS   European Data Protection Supervisor 
EDRi   European Digital Rights 
EFTA  European Free Trade Association 
ENISA  European Union Agency for Cybersecurity 
EU  European Union 
GAC   Governmental Advisory Committee 
GDPR   General Data Protection Regulation 
GIS   Geographic information systems 
GPS   Global Positioning System 
ISA   Intelligent Speed Assistance 
ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
ICANN  Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
IETF   Internet Engineering Task Force 
IGF  Internet Governance Forum 
JRC  European Commission's Joint Research Centre 
KBA   Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (Germany's Federal Motor Transport Authority) 
NetzDG  Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (German Network Enforcement law) 
NOx   Nitrogen Oxide 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
TSs   Technical Services for testing vehicles emissions 
UN  United Nations 
U.S.  United States 
WCIT   World Conference on International Telecommunications 
WSIS   World Summit on the Information Society 
W3C   World Wide Web Consortium
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